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Abstract
Is the observed rapid increase in consumer debt over the last three decades good news for
consumers? This paper quantitatively studies macroeconomic and welfare implications of re-
laxing borrowing constraints when consumers exhibit a hyperbolic discounting preference. In
particular, I construct a calibrated general equilibrium life-cycle model with uninsured idiosyn-
cratic earnings shocks and a quasi-hyperbolic discounting preference and examine the effect of
relaxation of the borrowing constraint which generates increased indebtedness. The model can
capture the two contrasting views associated with increased indebtedness: the positive view,
which links increased indebtedness to ﬁnancial sector development and better insurance, and
the negative view, which associates increased indebtedness with consumers’ over-borrowing. I
ﬁnd that while there is a welfare gain as large as 0.4% of ﬂow consumption from a relaxed bor-
rowing constraint, which is consistent with the observed increase in aggregate debt between
1980 and 2000 in the model with standard exponential discounting consumers, there is a wel-
fare loss of 0.2% in the model with hyperbolic discounting consumers. This result holds in
spite of the observational similarity of the two models; the macroeconomic implications of a
relaxed borrowing constraint are similar between the two models. Cross-sectionally, although
consumers of high and low productivity gain and medium productivity consumers suffer due to
a relaxed borrowing constraint in both models, the welfare gain of low-productivity consumers
is substantially reduced (and becomes negative in the case of strong hyperbolic discounting) in
the hyperbolic discounting model due to the welfare loss from over-borrowing. Finally, I ﬁnd
that the optimal (social welfare maximizing) borrowing limit is 15% of average income, which
is substantially lower than both the optimal level implied by the exponential discounting model
(37%) and the level of the U.S. economy in 2000 implied by the model (29%).
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Figure 1: Total unsecured consumer debt over GDP , Source: Federal Reserve Board, G.19
1 Introduction
Since the early 1980s, there has been a substantial increase in the indebtedness of U.S. consumers,
although there might be a reversal of the trend with the ongoing deep recession. Total household
debt in the U.S. increased from 43% of GDP in 1982 to 62% in 2000.1 Both unsecured and secured
debt increased. The aggregate balance of unsecured debt increased from 5% of total income in the
early 1980s to 9%.2 Figure 1 shows the trend of unsecured consumer debt relative to GDP .3 It was
close to zero before 1970, rose to 2% by 1980, and has stabilized around 7% since 2000. While
an increase in indebtedness is often seen as a result of an innovation in the ﬁnancial sector and
thus is linked to a positive welfare effect, there are two concerns. First, increased indebtedness is
closely related to under-saving, which slows down capital accumulation. Second, there is a popular
perception that consumers might be over-borrowing and over-consuming. The second concern has
not been studied, since it cannot be systematically captured by models with a time-consistent
preference. This is the main contribution of the current paper.
1 Smith (2009).
2 Livshits et al. (2007a).
3 Unsecured consumer debt is measured as the revolving consumer credit in the G.19 series of the Federal Reserve
Board (FRB). In the FRB data, total consumer credit consists of non-revolving and revolving credit. Revolving credit
mainly consists of loans for automobiles, mobile homes, and boats but also includes some unsecured credit. Livshits
et al. (2007a) constructed an unsecured consumer credit data series that includes not only revolving credit but also
part of non-revolving credit. However, the difference between the revolving credit and the unsecured consumer
credit they constructed is small (less than one percentage point as percentage of disposable income) for the period
where more reliable data are available (after 1989).
2In this paper I examine the macroeconomic and welfare implications of a relaxed borrowing con-
straint in the general equilibrium life-cycle model with hyperbolic discounting consumers. In par-
ticular, I assume that the increased indebtedness is due to a relaxed borrowing constraint that
consumers face, calibrate the borrowing constraints so that the induced indebtedness matches ob-
served aggregate debt level, and study the macroeconomic and welfare implications associated
with the relaxed borrowing limit. The hyperbolic discounting model has become popular for an-
alyzing consumers’ behavior, especially behavior associated with borrowing and defaulting, since
many researchers argue that the hyperbolic discounting model not only is consistent with exper-
imental evidence but also is able to replicate some dimensions of consumers’ behavior that the
standard exponential discounting model cannot. By introducing a time-inconsistent preference
into a standard macroeconomic model, and calibrating the model, I can systematically and quan-
titatively investigate the welfare implications associated with an increased indebtedness in the
hyperbolic discounting model.
The model developed here is built on the incomplete market general equilibrium models initially
developed by Huggett (1996) and Aiyagari (1994). Since this class of models allows researchers to
explicitly study heterogeneity either due to ex-ante heterogeneity or due to market incompleteness
within a standard general equilibrium macroeconomic framework, the models have been extended
in a variety of ways and widely used to analyze a variety of issues, including business cycles, wealth
inequality, optimal taxation, Social Security reform, and asset pricing. The model developed in the
current paper introduces a hyperbolic discounting preference into the standard incomplete market
general equilibrium model. The model is closest to the one by˙ Imrohoro˘ glu et al. (2003), but they
do not focus on the heterogeneity, while the heterogeneous welfare effect on different types of
consumers is a key aspect of the analysis in the current paper.
The model developed in the current paper is also built on the recent developments in the quanti-
tative model with hyperbolic discounting consumers. The pioneer work is Laibson (1997). I will
review the literature on hyperbolic discounting in Section 2.1. Most existing works with hyperbolic
discounting consumers are built on the partial equilibrium consumption-savings model of Deaton
(1991) and Carroll (1997), while the general equilibrium plays an important role in the main re-
sults of the paper here.4 In addition, the current paper is one of the few that focus not only on the
implications of the allocation of hyperbolic discounting, but also on the welfare implications.5
There are ﬁve main ﬁndings. First, when calibrated using the same strategy, models with ex-
ponential discounting and hyperbolic discounting are observationally similar in terms of average
life-cycle proﬁles of consumption, savings, and borrowing. The ﬁnding echoes what Angeletos et
al. (2001) ﬁnd and is closely related to the observationally equivalence result of Barro (1999).
Even though a hyperbolic discounting preference induces consumers to over-consume through a
low short-term discount factor compared with the exponential discounting model, the long-term
discount factor must be calibrated to be higher in the hyperbolic discounting model to match the
aggregate capital stock, which basically nulliﬁes the effect of the low short-term discount factor.
Second, although average life-cycle proﬁles are observationally similar, the two models have some
4 Notable exceptions are˙ Imrohoro˘ glu et al. (2003) and Krusell et al. (2009).
5 Notable exceptions are Krusell et al. (2009) and Petersen (2004).
3different cross-sectional implications; the model with hyperbolic discounting consumers gener-
ates (i) more borrowing-constrained consumers, (ii) higher dispersion of wealth, and (iii) higher
consumption volatility. Third, not only are the models observationally similar, in particular the
average life-cycle proﬁles, in the stationary equilibrium, the aggregate response to a relaxed bor-
rowing constraint is both qualitatively and quantitatively similar between the two models. Because
of the observational similarity, it is hard to distinguish the two models by the response in terms of
macroeconomic aggregates. Fourth, even though macroeconomic implications are similar, the two
models have sizably different welfare implications. More speciﬁcally, while a relaxed borrowing
constraint has a positive effect to social welfare in the model with exponential discounting con-
sumers, hyperbolic discounting consumers on average suffer from a relaxed borrowing constraint
mainly because of over-consumption. The problem is serious from a policy perspective because the
two models are hard to distinguish from the allocation but have contrasting welfare implications.
Finally, the optimal level of borrowing limit is substantially lower at about 15% of the average
total income in the model with hyperbolic discounting compared with the standard exponential
discounting model, whose optimal borrowing limit is about 37%. This is a direct implication of
the over-borrowing feature of the model with hyperbolic discounting. When consumers exhibit a
hyperbolic discounting preference, there is a positive welfare effect of restricting borrowing by
consumers.
I review the related literature, particularly on hyperbolic discounting models and on the increased
indebtedness of the U.S. consumers since the early 1980s, in Section 2. Section 3 develops the
model. Section 4 describes how the model is calibrated for quantitative exercises. Since the model
is solved numerically, Section 5 gives an overview of the computational algorithm. More details can
be found in Appendix A.2. Section 6 presents the main results of the paper. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Hyperbolic Discounting
Strotz (1956) ﬁrst argue that people are more impatient with respect to short-run trade-offs than
to long-run trade-offs, and formalize the dynamic inconsistency problem using a game played
against future selves.6 Phelps and Pollak (1968) use the quasi-hyperbolic discounting function in
the context of intergenerational time preferences; the consumer in the current generation discounts
the utility of the next generation with a higher discount rate than the rate applied to the subsequent
generations. The quasi-hyperbolic discounting used in the current paper was ﬁrst used by Laibson
(1997) in the context of a life-cycle model with a time-inconsistent preference.7
6 Angeletos et al. (2001) provide a good summary of the literature.
7 The actual discount factor function used in the “hyperbolic discounting” models are strictly not hyperbolic, but it is
called by that name because originally a hyperbolic function was used. Krusell and Smith (2000) call the preference
quasi-geometric discounting, which offers a more precise description of the actual discount factor function typically
used in the literature. The preference is also called present bias.
4Following Laibson (1997), there has been a surge in research on the hyperbolic discounting pref-
erence. Laibson (1997) studies the role of an illiquid asset like housing in providing an imperfect
commitment device for time-inconsistent consumers. Laibson et al. (2003) uses a hyperbolic dis-
counting model to explain why many people carry a balance on credit cards with a high interest
rate even if they also carry a positive balance of a liquid asset. Angeletos et al. (2001) compare the
implications of models with exponential and hyperbolic discounting consumers and argue that the
hyperbolic discounting model replicates various dimensions of consumption and savings behav-
ior better than the standard exponential discounting model. Laibson et al. (2007) use simulated
method of moments to jointly estimate key parameters associated with the hyperbolic discount-
ing model. Malin (2008) studies the role of a savings ﬂoor when consumers exhibit a hyperbolic
discounting preference. ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu et al. (2003) study the macroeconomic and welfare effects
of having an unfunded Social Security program in the model with a hyperbolic discounting con-
sumers. Barro (1999) studies the neoclassical growth model with a hyperbolic discounting prefer-
ence. Tobacman (2009) investigates the wealth distribution of such a model.
Although the hyperbolic discounting preference potentially has welfare implications very different
from those in the standard exponential discounting preference, not many papers quantitatively
study the welfare implications of the macroeconomic model with a hyperbolic discounting prefer-
ence. Notable exceptions are˙ Imrohoro˘ glu et al. (2003), Krusell et al. (2009) and Petersen (2004).
˙ Imrohoro˘ glu et al. (2003) study how the welfare implications of Social Security reform are dif-
ferent between the standard exponential discounting model and hyperbolic discounting models.
Krusell et al. (2009) show that in the model with temptation and self-control, which can be consid-
ered as the generalization of the hyperbolic discounting preference studied in the current paper, a
savings subsidy (or negative capital income tax) is optimal. This is because a savings subsidy pre-
vents consumers from over-consuming and under-saving and thus helps consumers overcome the
temptation for current consumption. Petersen (2004) studies the welfare implications of various
tax policies in the life-cycle general equilibrium model.
2.2 Increasing Indebtedness in the U.S.
The two papers most closely related to the current paper are Campbell and Hercowitz (2009)
and Obiols-Homs (2009). Both papers investigate the welfare consequences associated with the
rising debt in the U.S., but both use the standard exponential discounting preference. Campbell
and Hercowitz (2009) study the welfare implications of the observed increase in consumer debt, in
particular, secured debt. They use the calibrated general equilibrium model of impatient borrowers
(who have a perpetually lower discount factor) and patient savers (with a perpetually higher
discount factor) and argue that the welfare effect is negative for borrowers and positive for savers.
Even though borrowers enjoy a welfare gain from relaxation of the down-payment constraint, a
negative effect from a higher equilibrium interest rate dominates the welfare gain from better
consumption smoothing. Naturally, savers gain substantially from the higher interest rate. As
discussed by Smith (2009), a problem of the paper is that the model is highly stylized, including
the assumption of the different discount factor. It is not clear if the quantitative result of the
paper is robust in a more general environment. Obiols-Homs (2009) studies the cross-section of
5the welfare effect of a relaxed borrowing limit, as in the current paper, in the general equilibrium
model with inﬁnitely lived consumers. The author ﬁnds that the welfare effect is non-linear, in
particular U-shaped, with respect to individual productivity. With the exponential discounting
model, the same property is obtained in the current paper.
Livshits et al. (2007a) investigate jointly the reasons behind the increase in unsecured loans and in
consumer bankruptcies. They ﬁnd that combination of a decline in the transaction cost of lending
and the cost of ﬁling for bankruptcy replicates what has occurred since the early 1980s quite well.
Benton et al. (2007) study over-borrowing from the point of view of behavioral economics using
survey evidence.
3 Model
The model is based on the general equilibrium life-cycle model of Huggett (1996), with the quasi-
hyperbolic discounting preference of Laibson (1996).
3.1 Demographics
Time is discrete. In each period, the economy is populated by I overlapping generations of con-
sumers. In time t, a measure (1+)t of consumers are born.  is the constant population growth
rate. Each generation is populated by a mass of measure-zero consumers. Consumers are born
at age 1 and could live up to age I. There is a probability of early death. Speciﬁcally, si is the
probability with which an age i consumer survives to age i +1. With probability (1 si), an age i
consumer does not survive to age i +1. I is the maximum possible age, which implies sI = 0.
Consumers retire at age 1 < IR < I. Consumers with age i < IR are called workers, and those with
age i  IR are called retirees. IR is ﬁxed; there is no retirement choice.
3.2 Preference
The preference of consumers is time separable and characterized by an instantaneous utility func-
tion and two discount factors. The instantaneous utility function u(c) is standard; it is strictly
increasing and strictly concave in c.
I use a quasi-hyperbolic discounting preference, which was ﬁrst analyzed by Phelps and Pollak
(1968) and used in a quantitative macroeconomic model in Laibson (1996) and Laibson et al.
(2007). According to their set-up, in period t, instantaneous utility in period t, t +1, t +2, t +3,
t +4,..., is discounted by 1, , , 2, 3,... Since  is used to discount utility from the current
period and the next, while  is used to discount future utility from the next period on,  and  are
called short-term and long-term discount rates, respectively. Notice that the standard exponential
6discounting is a special case with  = 1; in this case, future utility is discounted at the constant
rate of .
For an age i consumer, the expected life-time utility Ui can be deﬁned as follows:





The important feature of this class of preference is that the preference exhibits time inconsistency.
For example, the discount factor applied between period t + 1 and t + 2 in period t is , while
the discount factor between the same periods changes to  in period t + 1. When  2 (0,1),
the preference implies a present bias; if there is no constraint or commitment device, consumers
over-consume and under-save or over-borrow in retrospect.
3.3 Technology
There is a representative ﬁrm that has access to the following constant scale production technology:
Y = ZF(K, L) (2)
where Y is output, Z is the level of total factor productivity, K is capital stock, and L is labor supply.
Capital depreciates at a constant rate  per period.
3.4 Endowment
Consumers are born with zero assets. Each consumer is endowed with one unit of time each period
and inelastically supplies labor, since leisure is not valued. Labor productivity of a consumer is
characterized by e(i,p), where i captures the life-cycle proﬁle of labor productivity, and p is the
uninsured shock to labor productivity. p is assumed to have ﬁnite support; p 2 fp1,p2,...,pNg.
Each newborn consumer draws its initial p from an i.i.d. distribution where 0
p is the probability
attached to p. After the initial p is drawn, p follows a ﬁrst-order Markov process with p,p0 as the
transition probability from p to p0.
3.5 Market Arrangements
Capital and labor are traded competitively. Consumers are not allowed to trade state-contingent
securities but can borrow or save using asset a, subject to a borrowing constraint a.
73.6 Government
The government has three roles in the model: (i) running the Social Security program, (ii) col-
lecting a proportional income tax, (iii) collecting accidental bequests using estate taxes and redis-
tributing the proceeds with a lump-sum transfer.
The government runs a simple pay-as-you-go Social Security program. The government imposes
a ﬂat payroll tax with the tax rate of S to all workers and uses the proceeds to ﬁnance Social
Security beneﬁts bi of current retirees. It is assumed that all retirees receive the same amount of
beneﬁts regardless of their contribution, and the government budget associated with the Social
Security program balances each period. Formally, bi = 0 for i < IR and bi = b for i  IR. b is the
constant amount of Social Security beneﬁt.
The government collects a proportional general income tax with tax rate I. Both capital and labor
income are taxed at the same rate. The proceeds are not redistributed or valued by consumers.
Because of the stochastic death, there are accidental bequests in the model. I assume that the
government collects all of the accidental bequests using 100% of the estate taxes and redistributes
the proceeds equally to the surviving consumers every period. tr denotes the lump-sum transfer
under the program.
3.7 Consumer’s Problem
I deﬁne the problem of a consumer recursively. As I will state formally in the next section, I
focus on the stationary equilibrium. Therefore, we can drop the aggregate state variables from the
individual consumer’s problem. The problem of an age i consumer with the current productivity
shock p and asset position a can be characterized by the following Bellman equation:
e V(i,p,a) = max
c,a0
2










0 = (a + tr)(1+ r(1 I))+ e(i,p)(1 I  S)w + bi (4)
a
0  a (5)
a0 = e ga(i,p,a) is the optimal decision rule associated with the Bellman equation above. Notice
that the value function on the left-hand side, e V(i,p,a), is different from the one on the right-hand
side, which is V(i,p,a). This is due to the time-inconsistency problem associated with the quasi-













0 = e ga(i,p,a) (7)
c = (a + tr)(1+ r(1 I))+ e(i,p)(1 I  S)w + bi   e ga(i,p,a) (8)
Mechanically, the consumer chooses the optimal asset level a0 with the discounting factor 
but the actual value function is evaluated with the discount factor . ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu et al. (2003)
distinguish the two cases in terms of what hyperbolic discounting consumers expect about their
own future decisions. According to their classiﬁcation, a naive consumer wrongly thinks that future
selves make decisions in a time-consistent manner (using only the discount factor ). On the other
hand, a sophisticated consumer thinks that future selves are time-inconsistent (using both  and
). The way I formalize the consumer’s problem, which is the same as in Laibson (1996) and
Laibson et al. (2007), can be classiﬁed as sophisticated consumers according to the classiﬁcation
of ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu et al. (2003). Angeletos et al. (2001) ﬁnd that naive and sophisticated hyperbolic
discounting consumers behave similarly in a life-cycle model.
3.8 Equilibrium
I will deﬁne below the recursive competitive equilibrium where the demographic structure is sta-
tionary, even though the size of the population is growing at a constant rate . In the equilibrium
with a stationary demographic structure, prices fr,wg are constant over time.
Let M be the space of individual state. (i,p,a) 2 M. Let M be the Borel    algebra generated
by M, and  the probability measure deﬁned over M. I will use a probability space (M,M,) to
represent a type distribution of consumers.
Deﬁnition 1 (Stationary recursive competitive equilibrium). A stationary recursive competitive equi-
librium is a set of prices fr,wg, government policy variables fbi,trg, aggregate capital stock K, aggre-
gate labor supply L, value functions V(i,p,a) and e V(i,p,a), optimal decision rule e ga(i,p,a), and the
stationary measure after normalization with respect to population growth, , such that:
1. Given the prices and policy variables, V(i,p,a) and e V(i,p,a) are a solution to the consumer’s
optimization problem deﬁned in Section 3.7, and e ga(i,p,a) is the associated optimal decision
rules.
2. The prices r and w are determined competitively, i.e.,
r = ZFK(K, L)  (9)
w = ZFL(K, L) (10)
3. Measure of consumers  is consistent with the demographic transition, the stochastic process of
shocks, and the optimal decision rules, after normalization with respect to population growth.


















e(i,p) w S d (13)









(1 si) e ga(i,p,a) d (14)
4 Calibration
4.1 Demographics
One period is set as one year in the model. Age 1 in the model corresponds to the actual age of
20. I is set at 81, meaning that the maximum actual age is 100. IR is set at 45, implying that
the agents become retired at the actual age of 65. The population growth rate, , is set at 1.2%
annually. This growth rate corresponds to the average annual population growth rate of the U.S.
over the last 50 years. The survival probabilities fsigI
i=1 are taken from the life table in Social
Security Administration (2007).8 In order to guarantee the maximum age of I = 81, s81 = 0 is
imposed. Figure 9 in Appendix A.1 shows the conditional survival probabilities used.
4.2 Preference


















Figure 2: Comparison of discount factors
 is set at 1.5, which is the commonly used value in the literature. It is also the point estimate of
Laibson et al. (2007).
Discount factors  and  are calibrated to be different for different model economies, but the
calibration strategy is the same. For all cases, I set the short-term discount factor  at ﬁrst and
calibrate the long-term discount factor  so that the capital-output ratio of the economy in the
baseline case is 3.0, which is the historical average value of the U.S. economy. In other words,
different model economies have different short-term discount factors , but they have the same
aggregate capital stock in equilibrium.9
In the model with the standard exponential discounting consumers,  = 1 by assumption. I found
that with  = 0.9740 the stationary equilibrium of the model generates a capital-output ratio of
3.0. For the model with hyperbolic discounting consumers, I use  = 0.70 as the baseline value
of the short-term discount factor and calibrate  such that the model achieves the same capital-
output ratio of 3.0. The short-term discount factor of 0.70 is the one-year discount factor typically
obtained from laboratory experiments. Moreover, the benchmark point estimate of Laibson et
al. (2007) is  = 0.703, or the annual short-term discount rate of about 40%. This procedure
generates  = 0.9910. The calibrated value of  is higher than 0.958, which is the value that
Laibson et al. (2007) estimate jointly with . A large part of the difference is due to the existence
of the mortality shock in the current model, which Laibson et al. (2007) do not have. If I adjust 
9 Both Angeletos et al. (2001) and Tobacman (2009) calibrate the long-term discount factor  for the model with
exponential discounting consumers such that the average wealth holding at age 63 (the age just before retirement)
is the same as in the model with hyperbolic discounting consumers where  and  are jointly estimated.
11that is obtained here by being multiplied by the average survival probability (0.9828), the effective
long-term discount factor becomes 0.974. Figure 2 compares the discount factors of the standard
exponential discounting and hyperbolic discount for periods 1 to 50. The calibrated  and  are
used. Notice that the discount factor function drops substantially more from period 1 to 2 in the
case of the hyperbolic discounting preference. On the other hand, the discount factor applied to
utility in the distant future is higher for the hyperbolic discounting model. Laibson (1997) argue
that housing, from which inhabitants can enjoy utility as long as they own it and live in it, has an
extra value for hyperbolic discounting consumers, since the dividends can be enjoyed for a long
period of time.
I also investigate the case when the discount rate is 80% annually, which is twice as high as in the
baseline hyperbolic discounting case. An 80% annual discount rate implies the short-term discount
factor  of 0.56. Using the same calibration strategy, the economy with a low short-term discount
factor yields  = 1.0005. Even though the long-term discount factor is above unity, the effective
discount factor becomes less than one if the survival probability is taken into account.
4.3 Technology
The following standard Cobb-Douglas production function is assumed:
Y = ZF(K, L) = ZK
L
1  (16)
Z is pinned down such that, in the baseline steady state, the equilibrium wage is normalized to
one. The procedure implies Z = 0.896.  is set at 0.36. This value is consistent with the average
capital share of income of the U.S. economy. Capital is assumed to depreciate at the constant rate
of  = 0.06 per year. Huggett (1996) calibrates  = 0.06 by matching the depreciation-output
ratio of the model economy to its U.S. counterpart.
4.4 Endowment
I assume the following standard multiplicative form of individual productivity.
e(i,p) = ei p (17)
ei represents the age-earnings proﬁle and p is the individual productivity shock. Since retirement
age is ﬁxed at IR, ei = 0 for i  IR. To calibrate {eig
IR 1
i=1 , I follow Huggett (1996) and use the data on
the median earnings of male workers of different age groups from Social Security Administration
(2007).10 The median earnings data are multiplied by the employment to population ratio of
males in each age group. The employment to population ratio for each age group is obtained from
McGrattan and Rogerson (2004).11 Finally, the resulting age-productivity proﬁle is smoothed out
10 The earnings data are taken from Table 4.B6 of Social Security Administration (2007).
11 Table 3, 4, and 5 of McGrattan and Rogerson (2004).
12by ﬁtting the age proﬁle of the product of median earnings and the employment to population ratio
to a quadratic function of age. The resulting earnings proﬁle is shown in Figure 10 in Appendix A.1.
In order to calibrate the stochastic process for p, ﬁrst, following Huggett (1996), I assume that
the logarithm of p is drawn from a normal distribution N(0,2
0) and follows an AR(1) process
with the persistence parameter p and the standard deviation of the innovation term . These
assumptions imply that the earnings for each age group is log-normally distributed, which captures
the empirical distribution well. In sum, the stochastic process for p is characterized by a triplet
(p,2
0,2
). Following Huggett (1996), I set (p,2
0,2
) = (0.96,0.38,0.045). These parameter
values are consistent with existing estimates of the stochastic process of individual earnings shocks
and jointly replicate the empirical earnings Gini of 0.42.
The AR(1) process obtained above is approximated using the algorithm of Tauchen (1986) with
18 abscissas. Among the 18 possible realizations of p, 17 are equally-spaced between  4p and
4p where p is the standard deviation of the unconditional distribution of p. In order to capture
to a certain extent the observed extreme concentration of earnings, the last abscissa is set at 6p.
4.5 Market Arrangements
In the baseline case, the borrowing limit a is set at zero; i.e., no borrowing is allowed. In experi-
ments, I relax the borrowing limit. I will relax the borrowing limit to the extent where the resulting
aggregate debt matches some target so that the aggregate amount of debt is the same between the
model and the corresponding U.S. economy.
4.6 Government
The payroll tax rate for the Social Security contribution S is set at 0.10, which is the average
contribution to the Social Security program as a fraction of labor income in the U.S. The propor-
tional income tax rate of I = 0.2378 is set to match the ratio of total (federal, state, and local)
government consumption over total income. The historical average of the ratio for the U.S. is
0.195.
5 Computation
Since there is no analytical solution to the model, the model is solved numerically. The solution
algorithm is standard. Both the value functions and the optimal decision rule are approximated
using piecewise linear functions. The optimal decision with respect to saving is solved using a
golden section search. The equilibrium prices (wage and interest rate) and the transfer are found
using iteration. Details about the numerical procedure are found in Appendix A.2.
136 Main Results
In Section 6.1, I compare the life-cycle proﬁles of economies with standard exponential discounting
and hyperbolic discounting. The purpose is to investigate the (non-)difference in the life-cycle pro-
ﬁles generated by the time-inconsistent preference. In Section 6.2, I investigate the cross-sectional
distribution of wealth in both economies. In Sections 6.3 and 6.4, I investigate the effect of the
changes in the borrowing limit in the model with exponential discounting and with hyperbolic
discounting. For the hyperbolic discounting model, two economies with different short-term dis-
count factors (0.70 and 0.56) are investigated. I will analyze the changes in the macroeconomic
aggregates and distribution in Section 6.3 and study the welfare implications of changes in the
budget constraint in Section 6.4.
6.1 Life-Cycle Proﬁles
Figure 3 compares the life-cycle proﬁles of the model economies with the standard exponential
discounting on the left and with the hyperbolic discounting (with the short-term discount factor
of  = 0.70) on the right. The top two panels compare the average proﬁles of total income,
consumption, and savings over the life-cycle. The middle two panels compare the average proﬁle
of asset holdings in two model economies. What is most striking is that there is little difference
between the two model economies in terms of the average life-cycle proﬁle. In both economies, the
average consumption proﬁle is ﬂatter than the income proﬁle. Consumers save during the working
period and dissave during the retirement period.
The bottom two panels of Figure 3 compare the cross-sectional variance of earnings and consump-
tion over the life-cycle in two model economies. Since there is no labor-leisure decision, the proﬁle
for earnings is common between the two ﬁgures. The variance of consumption increases with
age in both model economies, which is a feature of the life-cycle model with a highly persistent
earnings shock. The only noticeable difference between the two ﬁgures is that the consumption
variance increases faster in the model with hyperbolic discounting consumers especially toward
the end of the working period. The feature is due to the extreme assumption of the constant Social
Security beneﬁt. If the amount of beneﬁt is positively but imperfectly correlated with the contri-
bution, which is the case in the U.S. economy, the spike of the consumption variance at the time of
retirement substantially weakens.
6.2 Wealth Inequality
Table 1 compares the statistics related to the wealth inequality of the models and the data. Fig-
ure 4 compares the Lorenz curves for the U.S. economy and model economies with exponential
and hyperbolic discounting. The statistics are based on the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)
1998 wave, computed by Budría et al. (2002). When the parameters are calibrated such that the
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Figure 3: Comparison between exponential discounting and hyperbolic discounting models
15Table 1: Wealth distribution
Mean= Prop Proportion of wealth held by
Economy Gini Median  0 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th top 1%
U.S.1 0.803 4.03 0.099 -0.3 1.3 5.0 12.2 81.7 34.7
Exponential 0.726 3.61 0.234 0.0 0.7 5.8 19.1 74.4 11.9
Hyperbolic ( = 0.70) 0.733 4.02 0.284 0.0 0.4 5.4 19.1 75.1 11.9
Hyperbolic ( = 0.56) 0.734 4.24 0.308 0.0 0.3 5.1 19.5 75.0 11.9
1 Source: Survey of Consumer Finances 1998, statistics computed by Budría et al. (2002).
ence generates a slightly higher wealth inequality. The Gini index for total wealth in the baseline
hyperbolic discounting model is 0.733, which is slightly higher than 0.726, the Gini index for the
exponential discounting model. In terms of the skewness of the wealth distribution, the hyperbolic
discounting model generates a substantially higher skewness; the mean/median ratio of wealth is
3.61 for the exponential discounting model, while it is 4.02 in the hyperbolic discounting model.
The value for the hyperbolic discounting model is close to the empirical value of 4.03.
The reason behind the higher wealth inequality is that more consumers are consuming all of their
income and saving nothing in the hyperbolic discounting model. The proportion of consumers
with non-positive assets (which means zero, because borrowing is prohibited for now) is 0.284 in
the hyperbolic discounting model, compared with 0.234 for the exponential discounting model.
In terms of the top end of the wealth distribution, both the exponential discounting model and
the hyperbolic discounting model fail to replicate the extreme wealth concentration at the top
of the distribution; the proportion of wealth held by the top 1% wealthiest is the same across
the models at 11.9%, and it is far below the empirical value of 34.7%.12 The features of the
hyperbolic discounting model become stronger in the model with a very low short-term discount
factor ( = 0.56), but the additional change in the Gini index is small (from 0.733 to 0.734).
Tobacman (2009) also compares the wealth inequality implied by models with exponential and
hyperbolic discounting. In the baseline case with both liquid and illiquid assets, the model with
hyperbolic discounting exhibits a Gini index of 0.508, which is slightly higher than the value for the
exponential discounting model (0.488). The magnitude of the difference is comparable to what
is obtained here. In the models with only liquid assets like the current model, however, he ﬁnds
a sizable difference in terms of wealth inequality between exponential and hyperbolic discounting
models; the wealth Gini index with a = 0 is 0.720 for the hyperbolic discounting model, while it
is 0.630 for the exponential discounting model.
12 The failure to replicate the extreme concentration of wealth is partly because the individual productivity process
is calibrated based on the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), where very rich households are substantially
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Figure 4: Lorenz curve for the wealth distribution
6.3 Rising Indebtedness: Macroeconomic Implications
I will investigate the macroeconomic and welfare implications of the increased indebtedness in
the models with exponential and hyperbolic discounting. In particular, I assume that the increased
indebtedness is due to a relaxed borrowing constraint that consumers face, calibrate the borrowing
constraints so that the induced indebtedness matches observed aggregate debt level, and inquire
the macroeconomic and welfare implications associated with the relaxed borrowing limit. This
section studies the macroeconomic implications and Section 6.4 analyzes the welfare implications.
The focus is on the difference between the implications of the standard exponential discounting
model and those of the hyperbolic discounting models. I show in the previous section that, when
calibrated to the same set of targets, in particular aggregate wealth, the steady state implica-
tions are similar between the models with different preference speciﬁcations. If, in addition, the
macroeconomic and welfare implications of increased indebtedness are also similar between the
exponential and hyperbolic discounting models, there is no need to use the non-standard hyper-
bolic discounting preference for an analysis of increased indebtedness. What I will show is that
this is not the case; in particular, the welfare implications are very different between the models
with different preference speciﬁcations.
Table 2 summarizes the macroeconomic implications of rising aggregate debt from 1970 to 1980
and 2000. The ﬁrst panel summarizes the results of the exponential discounting model. The three
rows correspond to the economies in the three time periods: The ﬁrst one corresponds to the 1970
economy, where borrowing does not exist, i.e., a = 0. This is the economy calibrated in Section 4.
The second economy is called the 1980 economy, where the borrowing limit is relaxed such that
17Table 2: Macroeconomic implications of rising debt
Economy1 a2 D/Y K3 Y3 r% wage Var(c)4
Exponential discounting model ( = 1.00)
1970 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 6.01 1.000 0.481
1980  0.103  0.020 0.986 0.995 6.11 0.995 0.465
2000  0.337  0.070 0.959 0.985 6.33 0.985 0.455
Hyperbolic discounting model ( = 0.70) with a of exponential discounting model
1970 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 5.99 1.000 0.489
1980  0.103  0.023 0.989 0.996 6.09 0.996 0.474
2000  0.337  0.082 0.960 0.985 6.32 0.985 0.468
Hyperbolic discounting model ( = 0.70)
1970 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 5.99 1.000 0.489
1980  0.090  0.020 0.988 0.996 6.09 0.996 0.475
2000  0.290  0.070 0.964 0.987 6.29 0.987 0.467
Hyperbolic discounting model ( = 0.56)
1970 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 5.95 1.002 0.504
1980  0.080  0.020 0.988 0.996 6.04 0.998 0.492
2000  0.271  0.070 0.965 0.987 6.22 0.990 0.484
1 1970: Economy with no borrowing. 1980: economy calibrated to D=Y = 2%. 2000: Economy
calibrated to D=Y = 7%. 70 80: Difference between 1970 and 1980 economies. For the second
panel, borrowing constraints that are obtained in the exponential discounting model are used in
the hyperbolic discounting model with  = 0.70.
2 Borrowing limit relative to total income.
3 Level in 1970 economy normalized to one.
4 Average of cross-sectional variances of consumption for all age groups.
the aggregate amount of debt in the new stationary equilibrium is 2% of output. This target
corresponds to the aggregate amount of unsecured debt in the U.S. economy in the early 1980s.
The third economy is the 2000 economy, where the borrowing limit is further relaxed such that
the economy exhibits an aggregate amount of debt as large as 7% of output. You can see from the
second column in the ﬁrst panel that, for the exponential discounting model, a borrowing limit of
the size of 10.3% and 33.7% of average income is needed to generate aggregate debt of 2% and 7%
of GDP , respectively. Capital stock declines as the borrowing limit is relaxed. In the 2000 economy,
equilibrium capital stock is 4% lower than in the 1970 economy without borrowing. Since the
labor is inelastically supplied, the decline in capital stock generates a decline in output. Output in
the 2000 economy is about 1.5% lower than in the 1970 economy. The equilibrium interest rate
goes up from 6% in 1970 to 6.3% in 2000 as capital becomes more scarce, and wage declines as
capital stock declines. Since a relaxed borrowing constraint implies better consumption smoothing,
18consumption variance declines as the borrowing constraint is relaxed; consumption variance drops
from 0.48 in the 1970 economy to 4.55 in the 2000 economy.
Figure 5 compares the 1970 (no borrowing) and 2000 (7% debt to output ratio) economies with
both exponential and hyperbolic discounting consumers. Panels on the left side correspond to
the exponential discounting models, and panels on the right side are associated with hyperbolic
discounting models. Among the panels on the left side, the most notable change in the ﬁgures is
the change in the cross-sectional variance of log-consumption. In panel (e), it is easy to see that
the variance declines substantially for young consumers, at the expense of an increased variance
for later stages of life. Since some young consumers insure themselves better in the economy
with borrowing, the aggregate debt for the young on average increases (panel (c)). The average
consumption proﬁle becomes ﬂatter with borrowing (panel (a)).
The second panel in Table 2 summarizes the results for the baseline hyperbolic discounting model
( = 0.70), but with the borrowing constraints obtained from the exponential discounting model.
You can see in the column a that the borrowing constraints used in the second panel are the same
as those used in the ﬁrst panel. Most changes are quite similar between the ﬁrst and the second
panel. But there is one important difference: the response of the aggregate debt is substantially
stronger in the hyperbolic discounting model. When the borrowing constraint is relaxed such
that the debt increased by 2% of GDP in the exponential discounting model, the aggregate debt
over GDP increased by 2.3% in the hyperbolic discounting model. When the debt over GDP ratio
increased to 7% in the exponential discounting model, the same borrowing constraint induces an
8.2% debt over GDP ratio in the hyperbolic discounting model.
In the third panel, I implement the same procedure as in the ﬁrst panel for the baseline hyperbolic
discounting model ( = 0.70). Since the response of aggregate debt to a relaxed borrowing con-
straint is stronger in the hyperbolic discounting model, the borrowing constraints that induce a 2%
and 7% debt to GDP ratio are expected to be tighter than in the exponential discounting model.
By applying the same procedure to the hyperbolic discounting model, I am investigating the dif-
ference in the macroeconomic implications of an increased indebtedness depending on the model
used for the analysis. As expected, the borrowing constraints for the 1980 and 2000 economies
are tighter than for the exponential discounting model, 9% and 29% of average income, respec-
tively. Naturally, the responses of all the macroeconomic aggregates other than the debt to GDP
ratio (which is controlled) are weaker in the third panel. The right panels in Figure 5 exhibit
the life-cycle proﬁle of hyperbolic discounting models in 1970 (no debt) and 2000 (7% debt over
GDP). The changes by allowing debt are similar to those in the left panels, which are associated
with exponential discounting models.
The last panel in Table 2 summarizes the macroeconomic implications of an increased indebtedness
for the economy with strong hyperbolic discounting ( = 0.56). As in the case for the baseline
hyperbolic discounting model ( = 0.70), the borrowing constraints are calibrated so that the
economy generates a 2% and 7% aggregate debt to GDP ratio in 1980 and 2000 economies, re-
spectively. As the second column shows, the borrowing constraints have to be even tighter than
in the baseline hyperbolic discounting model because of the stronger response of debt to a re-
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Figure 5: Comparison of the models with and without borrowing
20Table 3: Macroeconomic effect of rising debt: partial and general equilibrium effects
Economy1 GE2 a3 D/Y K4 Y4 r% wage Var(c)5
Exponential discounting model ( = 1.00)
1970   0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 6.01 1.000 0.481
1980 PE  0.125  0.020 0.973 0.990 6.01 1.000 0.461
1980 GE  0.125  0.020 0.986 0.995 6.11 0.995 0.465
2000 PE  0.337  0.070 0.931 0.975 6.11 0.995 0.446
2000 GE  0.337  0.070 0.959 0.985 6.33 0.985 0.455
Hyperbolic discounting model ( = 0.70)
1970   0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 5.99 1.000 0.489
1980 PE  0.090  0.020 0.980 0.993 5.99 1.000 0.472
1980 GE  0.090  0.020 0.988 0.996 6.09 0.996 0.475
2000 PE  0.290  0.070 0.938 0.977 6.09 0.996 0.460
2000 GE  0.290  0.070 0.964 0.987 6.29 0.987 0.467
Hyperbolic discounting model ( = 0.56)
1970   0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 5.95 1.002 0.504
1980 PE  0.080  0.020 0.972 0.990 5.95 1.002 0.488
1980 GE  0.080  0.020 0.988 0.996 6.04 0.998 0.492
2000 PE  0.271  0.070 0.946 0.980 6.04 0.998 0.479
2000 GE  0.271  0.070 0.965 0.987 6.22 0.990 0.484
1 1970: Economy with no borrowing. 1980: economy calibrated to D=Y = 2%. 2000: Economy
calibrated to D=Y = 7%.
2 GE: general equilibrium. PE: partial equilibrium. For the 1980 economy, prices are ﬁxed at
the 1970 level. For the 2000 economy, prices are ﬁxed at the 1980 level.
3 Borrowing limit relative to total income.
4 Level in the 1970 economy normalized to one.
5 Average of cross-sectional variances of consumption for all age groups.
the size of the response of macroeconomic aggregates is even weaker than in the hyperbolic dis-
counting model with a higher (lower) discount factor (rate). For example, the cross-sectional
log-consumption variance declines by only 2 percentage points, while the consumption variance
drops by 2.6 percentage points and 2.2 percentage points in the economies with exponential dis-
counting and baseline hyperbolic discounting, respectively.
What is the role of general equilibrium in shaping the macroeconomic implications discussed
above? Table 3 shows the decomposition between the partial and the general equilibrium ef-
fect for both the exponential and the hyperbolic discounting models. In Table 3, rows associated
with GE (General Equilibrium) are the same as in Table 2. Rows associated with PE (Partial Equi-
librium) show the macroeconomic effects without the general equilibrium effect. For the 1980
21economy, prices are ﬁxed at the level of the 1970 economy, and the borrowing limit is relaxed to
the 1980 level. For the 2000 economy, prices are ﬁxed at the 1980 level, and the borrowing limit
is relaxed to the 2000 level. For all economies, the general equilibrium effect is clear: without the
general equilibrium effect, macroeconomic responses are quantitatively stronger. In other words,
the general equilibrium effect partly offsets the responses. Without the general equilibrium effect,
both capital stock and output decrease even more, and the log-consumption inequality declines to
a larger extent, too. There is no difference between the exponential and hyperbolic discounting
models in terms of the role of the general equilibrium effect.
6.4 Rising Indebtedness: Welfare Implications
In this section, I will investigate the welfare implications of increased indebtedness. Before starting
the analysis, two issues related to the welfare analysis in the current environment need to be
addressed. First, since the model used here features a heterogeneous agent model with life-cycle
and uninsured idiosyncratic shocks, there is no obvious way to deﬁne social welfare. I investigate
social welfare in two ways. First, I use the ex-ante expected life-time utility in the stationary
equilibrium as social welfare. The virtue of this welfare criterion is that this naturally takes into
account both the welfare gain or loss from changes in aggregate consumption (efﬁciency effect)
and the welfare gain or loss due to changes in the degree of insurance (insurance effect). For this
reason, the social welfare function is used to investigate the optimal capital income taxation by
Conesa et al. (2009). Because of the heterogeneity, it is also important to look at the heterogeneity
of the welfare effect for different types of consumers. To that end, I also investigate the expected
life-time utility in the stationary equilibrium for consumers with different initial productivity p.
Since the productivity shock is highly persistent, looking at the welfare implications for consumers
with different initial p roughly corresponds to studying the heterogeneous effects on consumers
with different productivity potentials.
Second, when the hyperbolic discounting model is interpreted as the dynamic game between the
current and future selves, welfare of which self should be used? In particular, when the ex-ante
expected welfare is evaluated before a consumer is born, does the consumer discount utility in
period 2 by , as the consumer does in period 1, or just , as the consumer is considered to do












p e V(1,p,0) (19)
EV is deﬁned in the updating equation (6) and corresponds to the case where the second period
utility is discounted only by , while Ee V is deﬁned in the Bellman equation (3) and corresponds
to the case where utility in period 2 is discounted by . I use EV as the social welfare function
for the following reasons. First, Krusell et al. (2009) show that the hyperbolic discounting model
can be interpreted as the extreme case of the model with preference which exhibits temptation
22Table 4: Welfare implications of rising debt
Welfare gain3
Initial productivity
Economy1 GE2 EV Low Mid High
Exponential discounting model ( = 1.00)
1970-1980 PE +1.60 +4.53 +1.40 +0.02
1970-1980 GE +1.22 +3.96 +1.03 +0.08
1980-2000 PE +1.46 +4.71 +1.26 +0.04
1980-2000 GE +0.60 +3.34 +0.41 +0.16
Hyperbolic discounting model ( = 0.70)
1970-1980 PE +0.72 +2.18 +0.60  0.61
1970-1980 GE +0.46 +1.69 +0.35 +0.12
1980-2000 PE +0.25 +2.06 +0.17  0.32
1980-2000 GE  0.20 +1.12  0.28 +0.60
Hyperbolic discounting model ( = 0.56)
1970-1980 PE +0.24 +1.09 +0.11 +1.76
1970-1980 GE +0.10 +0.58 +0.02 +4.86
1980-2000 PE  0.17 +0.82  0.22  3.34
1980-2000 GE  0.36  0.05  0.41 +0.20
1 1970: Economy with no borrowing. 1980: economy calibrated to D=Y = 2%. 2000:
Economy calibrated to D=Y = 7%.
2 GE: general equilibrium. PE: partial equilibrium. For the 1980 economy, prices are ﬁxed
at the 1970 level. For the 2000 economy, prices are ﬁxed at the 1980 level.
3 Welfare gain measured by the percentage increase in ﬂow consumption associated with
relaxing the borrowing limit.
and self-control. When this interpretation is employed, the utility of an individual is naturally
deﬁned as EV.13 Second, the important consideration in the current paper is the welfare loss due
to the relaxed borrowing constraint and over-consumption. The notion of welfare loss from excess
consumption naturally supports the use of the ex-post utility function. Malin (2008) uses the same
welfare criteria in a three period model to study the optimality of savings ﬂoors when preference
exhibits a present-bias.
Table 4 summarizes the welfare implications of increased indebtedness in both the exponential and
the hyperbolic discounting models. Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the welfare gain of moving from the
1980 economy to the 2000 economy for consumers with different initial productivity p. Figure 6
compares the heterogeneous welfare effect with and without a general equilibrium effect in the
model with exponential discounting consumers. Figure 7 compares the heterogeneous welfare
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Figure 6: Heterogeneity of welfare gain: Partial and general equilibrium
effect in models with exponential and hyperbolic discounting consumers, taking into account the
general equilibrium effect.
First, let us focus on the model with exponential discounting consumers (the top panel of Table 4
and Figure 6). In the exponential discounting model, a relaxed borrowing constraint yields a wel-
fare gain in terms of ex-ante expected life-time utility of a consumer. By moving from the 1970
economy (no borrowing) to the 1980 economy (D=Y = 2%), there is a gain in social welfare
equivalent to as large as 1.2% of ﬂow consumption. Moving from the 1980 economy to the 2000
economy (D=Y = 7%) is associated with a social welfare gain of 0.6%. In both transitions, the gen-
eral equilibrium effect offsets some of the gain, through lower output associated with lower capital
stock. With respect to the welfare effect on consumers with different productivity potentials, three
groups with different initial productivity are affected very differently. First, those with initial low
productivity beneﬁt most from the relaxed borrowing constraint. This is because the likelihood
that they are constrained by the borrowing limit is highest for this group of consumers. However,
they experience a welfare loss from the general equilibrium effect. In Figure 6, the line represent-
ing the welfare effect, which takes the general equilibrium effect into account, is located below
the line representing the welfare effect without the general equilibrium effect, for consumers with
low initial productivity. The reason is a lower equilibrium wage and a higher equilibrium interest
rate, caused by a lower capital stock. Since the consumers in the group tend to borrow more often,
and the main source of their income is labor income, both price effects hit consumers negatively.
Second, the group with high initial productivity does not gain much from the partial equilibrium
effect. For those with the highest initial productivity, the welfare gain without the general equilib-
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Figure 7: Heterogeneity of welfare gain: Exponential and hyperbolic discounting
the borrowing limit, they do not gain much from a relaxed borrowing constraint. However, they
gain from the general equilibrium effect, albeit to a small extent. This is because they most likely
remain savers throughout their lives, and they beneﬁt from a high interest rate, although part of
the gain is offset by a lower wage. This contrasting general equilibrium effect for high and low
productivity consumers is exactly what Campbell and Hercowitz (2009) emphasize in a different
but closely related environment. In the model by Campbell and Hercowitz (2009) with secured
credit, high discount rate consumers who remain borrowers lose from the general equilibrium ef-
fect, and low discount rate consumers gain from the general equilibrium effect. In their setup,
the general equilibrium effect is strong enough to incur welfare loss for consumers with low initial
productivity (in their case, high discount rate consumers), but the effect is not strong enough to
overturn the welfare gain from the partial equilibrium effect here. Finally, interestingly, consumers
with moderate initial productivity suffer from the relaxed borrowing constraint. This is due to the
combination of the weak welfare gain from the relaxed borrowing limit and the stronger negative
welfare loss from a lower wage and a higher interest rate. As a result, the solid line in Figure 6,
which represents the welfare effect for heterogeneous consumers, exhibits a U-shape. This is the
same property that Obiols-Homs (2009) found in a slightly different environment.
How about the welfare implications of an increased indebtedness for the economy with hyper-
bolic discounting consumers? The middle and bottom panels of Table 4 summarize the welfare
effects in hyperbolic discounting models with varying degrees of the strength of hyperbolic dis-
counting. Figure 7 compares the heterogeneity of welfare effects across consumers with different
initial productivity in the models with exponential and hyperbolic discounting. Regarding social
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Figure 8: Level of borrowing limit and social welfare
positive (0.5% of ﬂow consumption), if the 1970 economy and the 1980 economy with the base-
line ( = 0.70) hyperbolic discounting are compared, there is a social welfare loss of 0.2% of ﬂow
consumption between the 1980 and 2000 economies. In the case of stronger ( = 0.56) hyperbolic
discounting, the welfare loss between the 1980 and 2000 economies is as large as 0.4% of ﬂow
consumption. Cross-sectionally, although the U-shape is still observed in Figure 7, there are signif-
icant differences. The difference is especially striking for consumers with low initial productivity.
Their gain from having a relaxed borrowing limit is signiﬁcantly smaller in the case of the baseline
hyperbolic discounting and negative in the case of strong hyperbolic discounting. The key reason
is the negative welfare effect of over-borrowing. Those who are close to the borrowing constraint
beneﬁt from having a less strict borrowing constraint, which facilitates consumption smoothing
across time and states, but suffer from borrowing more than is optimal in retrospect.
The discussion in this section implies that the optimal level of the borrowing constraint differs,
potentially substantially, across models with different preference assumptions. Here I deﬁne opti-
mal as the level of the uniform borrowing limit that is associated with the highest social welfare
deﬁned as the ex-ante expected life-time utility. The way optimality is deﬁned here is closely re-
lated to the way the optimal capital income tax rate is deﬁned in Conesa et al. (2009). Figure 8
exhibits social welfare under different levels of the borrowing constraint in the models with ex-
ponential and hyperbolic discounting. Three things are worth pointing out. First, the solid line,
which is for the model with exponential discounting consumers, is located above the other lines,
which are associated with the hyperbolic discounting models, implies that the welfare gain is al-
ways higher in the exponential discounting model, conditional on the same level of borrowing
constraint. Second, all lines are hump shaped, because the equilibrium effect from a lower capital
26stock dominates at some point for all economies. Third, the optimal level of the borrowing limit
is decreasing in the strength of the hyperbolic discounting. This is because hyperbolic discounting
preference implies smaller (or negative) welfare gain from relaxed borrowing constraint for low
productivity consumers.
For the exponential discounting model, the level of the uniform borrowing limit that maximizes
social welfare is 37% of average income. Interestingly, this level turns out to be very close to the
level in the 2000 economy (34%), which generates 7% debt-to-output ratio in the steady state. In
other words, the model with exponential discounting consumers implies that the 2000 economy is
close to the optimal level in terms of the strength of the borrowing constraint. On the other hand, in
the baseline ( = 0.70) hyperbolic discounting model, the optimal level is 15% of average income.
This optimal level is substantially lower than in the hyperbolic discounting model, because of the
welfare loss from over-borrowing, and the stronger general equilibrium effect. Not only that, the
optimal level is substantially lower than 29%, which is the borrowing limit of the 2000 economy.
In other words, according to the baseline hyperbolic discounting model, the 2000 U.S. economy
features an excessively relaxed borrowing constraint. In the case of stronger hyperbolic discounting
( = 0.56), the optimal borrowing limit declines further to 11% of the average income.
Just as commitment by using an illiquid asset is valued in Laibson (1997) and forced saving might
be welfare-improving in Malin (2008), the existence of a tight borrowing constraint prevents con-
sumers from over-consuming and thus potentially has a welfare-improving role. If the borrowing
constraint is tightened to the optimal level of 15% in the baseline hyperbolic discounting model,
there is a sizable welfare gain (about 0.4% of ﬂow consumption).
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the macroeconomic and welfare implications of rising indebtedness in
the U.S. using the model with hyperbolic discounting consumers. There are ﬁve main ﬁndings.
First, when calibrated to the same set of targets, models with exponential and hyperbolic dis-
counting exhibit similar life-cycle proﬁles. Even if the short-term discount factor of the hyperbolic
discounting models induce consumers to borrow or dissave more and consume more in the current
period than in the exponential discounting model, the long-term discount rate must be calibrated
much higher than the exponential discounting model. Second, there are some differences cross-
sectionally; basically, hyperbolic discounting models expand the wealth distribution and push more
consumers to borrowing or zero saving. Third, not only are the two models observationally similar
in terms of aggregates, the two models have similar predictions in terms of macroeconomic changes
in response to a relaxed borrowing constraint. Fourth, although the macroeconomic implications
of the relaxed borrowing limit are similar between the two models, the welfare implications are
very different; Hyperbolic discounting models imply signiﬁcantly lower or even negative welfare
effects associated with rising indebtedness. In particular, I ﬁnd that when debt increases to the
same extent as in the period between 1980 and 2000, there is a negative effect on social welfare
as large as 0.2% of ﬂow consumption in the economies populated with hyperbolic discounting
27consumers. The difference in the welfare implications is very striking between the hyperbolic dis-
counting model and the standard exponential discounting model, since the standard model with
exponential discounting consumers implies a welfare gain (0.4% of ﬂow consumption). Finally,
the optimal borrowing limit is substantially lower in the hyperbolic discounting model. One could
interpret that the restriction on borrowing could be welfare-improving according to the hyperbolic
discounting model.
There are two ways to interpret the set of ﬁndings in the current paper. First, even though the
models with exponential and hyperbolic discounting are observationally similar in many dimen-
sions, they have very different welfare implications. Therefore, from the welfare perspective, even
though there is little need to use the non-standard hyperbolic preference to study macroeconomic
implications, it is important to ﬁnd other and better ways to distinguish between the two models.
Second, it might be possible to use the survey evidence to distinguish between the two models. If
we know how much consumers suffer from over-borrowing and over-consuming, we could map
the results into the strength of hyperbolic discounting, in particular, the level of the short-term
discount factor.
One interesting and important extension from the current paper is associated with consumer
bankruptcy. The increase in consumer debt has been accompanied by a substantial increase in
consumer bankruptcy. Recently, the consumer bankruptcy law was modiﬁed to make bankruptcy
more costly and not available to some consumers in order to discourage abuse of the law.14 The
standard equilibrium models of consumer bankruptcy15 imply that a tougher bankruptcy law might
beneﬁt consumers by allowing stronger commitment to repay. But it is not clear if the intuition
holds when consumers could suffer from over-consuming, as some argue. Nakajima (2009) inves-
tigates this issue.
14 See White (2007) for details.
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Figure 10: Average life-cycle proﬁle of labor productivity
29A.2 Computational Appendix
I will describe below the computational algorithm to solve the stationary equilibrium of the model.
I will focus on the model with hyperbolic discounting consumers. The solution method for the
exponential discounting model is straightforward.
Algorithm 1 (Computation algorithm for solving stationary equilibrium).
1. Set the initial guess of the aggregate capital K0 and per-consumer transfer tr0. Notice that
since there is no labor-leisure decision, aggregate labor supply L can be computed indepen-
dently. Similarly, the Social Security beneﬁt b can be computed independently from the solution
algorithm.
2. Given K0 and L, compute the interest rate r and the wage w. The transfer used in the iteration
is equal to the guess, i.e., tr = tr0.
3. Given ftr,r,wg, solve the consumer’s optimization problem using backward induction.
(a) Set V(I +1,p,a) = 0 for all p and a.
(b) Solve the problem of the consumer of age I, using the Bellman equation (3) for all p and
a. Future value function is interpolated using piece-wise linear functions. Optimal savings
level is found using golden section search. Notice that the Bellman equation is NOT used
for updating the value function. This step yields the optimal decision rule e ga(I,p,a).
(c) Use the optimal decision rule e ga(I,p,a) just obtained and (6) to update the value and
obtain V(I  1,p,a) 8p,a.
(d) With V(I  1,p,a) at hand, we can solve the problem of age I  1 consumers. Keep going
back in the same way until the value function and the optimal decision rule for age 1
(initial age) consumers are obtained.
4. Using the obtained optimal decision rule e ga(i,p,a), simulate the model.
(a) Set the type distribution for the newborns. In particular, all newborns have i = 1 and
a = 0. The distribution of p is subject to f0
pg.
(b) Update the type distribution using the stochastic process for p and the optimal decision rule
e ga(I,p,a). The optimal decision rule is interpolated using piece-wise linear approximation.
(c) Keep updating until age I (last age).
5. Compute the aggregate capital stock K1 and total amount of accidental bequests implied by the
simulated distribution. Notice that agents survive according to the survival probability, and
there is population growth, which makes size of the younger population larger. Make these
adjustments when computing the aggregate capital stock and accidental bequests. Speciﬁcally,
30when the measure of age 1 consumers is normalized to one, measures of age i consumers, e i can







where s0 = 1. Once the aggregate amount of accidental bequests is computed, we can compute
the per-consumer lump-sum transfer tr1.
6. Compare fK0,tr0g and fK1,tr1g. If they are sufﬁciently close, we can assume that fK0,tr0g
was the consistent guess and stop. Otherwise, update fK0,tr0g and go back to step 2.
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